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BALANCING PRIVACY AND PROOF:
DISCOVERY OF NONPARTY MEDICAL
RECORDS
RACHEL E. BROWN*
INTRODUCTION
What if your private medical records are being viewed by persons other
than yourself or your physician in a lawsuit in which you are not a party and have
zero involvement? Certainly, you would be shocked by the invasion of your
privacy. Now, consider instead, that you are a party to that lawsuit and the
discovery of nonparty medical records is necessary to prove your claim or defend
yourself in court. Would you want the opportunity to discover the nonparty
medical records in order to secure a just outcome for yourself?
Courts are frequently faced with the dilemma of whether nonparty medical
records should be discoverable in civil litigation. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (hereinafter “FRCP”)1 , provide that “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense….”2 On one hand, litigants’ due process rights and the judicial system’s
pursuit of the truth weighs heavily in favor of allowing discovery of relevant
nonparty medical records. All litigants deserve full and complete discovery in
order to have a meaningful opportunity to present their cases and obtain just
outcomes in court. On the other hand, nonparty privacy interests weigh heavily
against allowing discovery of relevant nonparty medical records. Medical
records are protected by strict federal and state laws governing privacy.
There is no clear answer among the courts as to which interest(s) should
prevail.
Many courts have held that nonparty medical records are discoverable only
upon a sufficient showing that the records are relevant to the issue in dispute and
©2018 Rachel Brown.
* I would like to thank Professor Donald Gifford for his invaluable feedback throughout the writing
process. I would also like to thank my family for all their unconditional love and support.
1. I will reference the FRCP throughout this paper because most states pattern their respective rules
of civil procedure after the federal rules. See Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff
Genetic Profiles by Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L. J. 877,
901 (1996).
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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identifying information is redacted.3 Other courts, citing nonparty privacy rights,
block all discovery of nonparty medical records even where nonparty identities
are protected.4
This paper surveys this issue and offers a solution on how courts should
handle requests for discovery of nonparty medical records. Part I of this paper
discusses nonparty privacy interest in the confidentiality of their medical records.
Part II considers litigants’ due process rights and the judicial system’s pursuit of
the truth. Part III briefly addresses the limited impact of the federal HIPAA
regulations on the discovery of nonparty medical records. Part IV briefly
describes the inadequacy of redaction and protective orders, used by the courts
to maintain nonparty privacy rights without denying discovery of relevant
nonparty medical records altogether. Finally, Part V recommends that discovery
of nonparty medical records should be permitted only upon a heightened showing
of “good cause,” which requires much more than mere relevance. This stricter
standard, coupled with the use of procedural safeguards, will help weed out
speculative discovery requests and reconcile the competing interests described
in Part I and Part II.
I. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DISCOVERY OF NONPARTY MEDICAL RECORDS
Privacy protections for medical records arise from a number of sources. The
United States Constitution protects an individual’s interest in avoiding the
disclosure of personal matters, including medical records.5 Most jurisdictions
recognize a physician-patient privilege, or similar statutory restriction, that
protects medical records from discovery in litigation. These privacy protections
and the potential negative ramifications of disclosure militate against the
discovery of nonparty medical records.
A. Medical Records Are Protected by the Constitutional Right to Privacy
Nonparties have constitutional privacy interests in preventing disclosure of
their medical records. Even though the United States Constitution does not
3. See, e.g., Terre Haute Reg’l Hosp., Inc. v. Trueblood, 600 N.E.2d 1358, 1362 (Ind. 1992) (holding
that “where adequate safeguards exist to protect the identity and confidentiality of the nonparty patient,
the trial court may allow the discovery of the nonparty patient medical records….”); State ex rel. Wilfong
v. Schaeperkoetter, 933 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (holding that discovery of nonparty
medical records may be ordered “if they were relevant to the medical malpractice claim and adequate
safeguards were provided to protect the non-parties as much as possible.”); Cmty. Hosp. Ass’n v. Dist.
Court, 570 P.2d 243, 244 (Colo. 1977) (en banc) (holding that the medical records of 140 patients were
held discoverable after names, addresses, occupation and marital status was removed).
4. See Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV. 195,
259–60 (2003); Ekstrom v. Temple, 553 N.E.2d 424, 430 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (plaintiff not entitled to
records of nonparty patients, with identification information deleted, due to physician-patient privilege);
In re: Columbia Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 41 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. App. 2001) (en banc) (holding that
redaction of identifying information did not defeat privilege).
5. See, infra notes 43–50 and accompanying text.
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explicitly mention a right of privacy, privacy is one of the fundamental rights it
guarantees for all citizens.6
The existence of the right to privacy in one’s medical records can be traced
to Whalen v. Roe,7 where the Supreme Court considered whether New York’s
statutory data collection scheme of personal patient health information violated
the patients’ constitutional right to privacy.8 Although upholding the statute as
constitutional,9 the Supreme Court specifically recognized that the right to
privacy protects “the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters.”10 The Supreme Court described this privacy interest as “a genuine
concern that the information will become publicly known and that it will
adversely affect [patients’] reputations.”11 A majority of the federal circuit courts
have interpreted the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
espoused in Whalen as a constitutional right to informational privacy.12 Medical
records fall within the ambit of this informational privacy right.13
State constitutions with provisions similar to the United States Constitution
imply a right to privacy in one’s medical records.14 Several states have explicit
provisions relating to the right to privacy.15

6. See Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts,
105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 475 (1991) (“Privacy [is] . . . among the most fundamental rights that we have as
citizens of this country.”).
7. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). For a more in-depth analysis of Whalen v. Roe, see Jessica C. Wilson, Note,
Protecting Privacy Absent a Constitutional Right: A Plausible Solution to Safeguarding Medical Records,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 657–60 (2007).
8. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591.
9. Id. at 603–04.
10. Id. at 599. The Whalen Court also recognized a second kind of interest that the right of privacy
protects: the right to make personal decisions. Id. at 599–600.
11. Id. at 600.
12. Daniel M. Nickels, Note, Casting the Discovery Net Too Wide: Defense Attempts to Disclose
Nonparty Medical Records in a Civil Action, 34 IND. L. REV 479, 497 (2001); For a more extensive
discussion of the treatment of informational privacy rights since Whalen, see Francis S.
Chlapowski, The Constitutional Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133 (1991).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3rd Cir. 1980) (stating
that “[t]here can be no question that . . . medical records, which may contain intimate facts of a personal
nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy protection”); Doe v. Md. Bd. Of Social
Work Examiners, 862 A.2d 996, 1008 (Md. 2004) (stating that “medical records fall within” the right to
privacy guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution).
14. See Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal Health
Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 325, 330 (2001); see, e.g., King v. State, 535 S.E.2d
492, 495 (Ga. 2000) (finding that medical records were protected by the constitutional right of privacy
under both the federal and Georgia constitutions).
15. See Pritts, supra note 14 at 330; see, e.g., CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 1. (“All people are by nature free
and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty,
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy.”).
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Ultimately, state and federal constitutional provisions provide nonparty
medical records limited protection from disclosure.16 A constitutional right,
whether federal or state, is limited to state action.17 Therefore, the constitutional
right to privacy does not effectively protect nonparty medical records from
discovery in civil tort actions between private litigants. And although the
protection afforded by the right to privacy is not absolute,18 a party seeking
discovery of nonparty medical records must overcome a high level of scrutiny.19
Courts often find that individual privacy interests in medical records are
outweighed by the state’s interest in disclosure.20
B. Medical Records Are Protected by the Physician-Patient Privilege
State physician-patient privilege laws embody the main source of
protection for the privacy of nonparty medical records.21 Nearly all American
jurisdictions have recognized the physician-patient privilege or similar
restrictions on disclosure through statute or case law.22 The Black’s Law
Dictionary defines the physician-patient privilege as “[a] patient’s right to
exclude from discovery and evidence in a legal proceeding any confidential
communication between the patient and a physician for the purpose of diagnosis
or treatment, unless the patient consents to the disclosure.”23 The privilege
generally extends to medical records to the extent that they contain confidential
communications between patients and their physicians.24
1. Purpose of the Physician-Patient Privilege
In creating the physician-patient privilege, state courts and legislatures
recognized that society’s interest in preserving the confidential nature of the
physician-patient relationship.25 The privilege encourages full and frank
communication between patients and physicians in order to make known to the
physician all information necessary for treatment and diagnosis, no matter how
16. Id. at 330.
17. Id.
18. Scott R. White, Comment, Discovery of Non-Parties’ Medical Records in the Face of the
Physician-Patient Privilege, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 523, 536 (2000).
19. Id. at 536.
20. See Pritts, supra note 14 at 330.
21. See Nickels, supra note 12, at 483–84. Federal law does not recognize a physician-patient
privilege. Id.
22. See Joseph S. Goode, Perspectives on Patient Confidentiality in the Age of AIDS, 44 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 967, 984 (1993); White, supra note 18, at 524. The exact scope of the physician-patient privilege
varies by state.
23. Physician-Patient Privilege, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
24. See White, supra note 18, at 524.
25. See Nickels, supra note 12, at 484; see, e.g., Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo. 1999)
(en banc) (noting that the sacrifice of relevant evidence “is warranted by the social importance of interests
and relationships that the privileges seek to protect.”).
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embarrassing or humiliating.26 Without assurance that their communications will
remain completely confidential, patients will be less forthcoming with sensitive
information necessary for effective medical treatment.27 Some patients may even
delay treatment or avoid it altogether.
Additionally, the physician-patient privilege allows the public “to rely upon
the expectation that physicians will not reveal their confidences.”28 Nonparties
should not have to fear the disclosure of medical information provided to their
physician in confidence. Indeed, there is a heightened sense of the need to protect
the intimate and sensitive personal information in one’s medical records.29
Disclosure of private medical information can adversely impact a person’s social
and economic well-being.30 “Modern medical records not only contain diagnoses
and treatment related data, but also contain personal information such as
employment history, financial history, lifestyle choices, and HIV status.”31 If this
confidential information gets into the wrong hands, nonparties may suffer
negative consequences, such as embarrassment, social stigmas, limited job
opportunities and lack of insurability.32
2. Privileged Medical Records Are Expressly Outside the Scope of
Discovery
The scope of discovery under Rule 26(b) expressly exempts from its reach
all privileged information.33 When a plaintiff in a personal injury suit places his
or her own medical condition(s) at issue,the physician-patient privilege is
impliedly waived with regards to the plaintiff’s relevant medical records.34 The
waiver is automatic because the plaintiff’s interest in confidentiality is
outweighed by the defendant’s interest in determining the validity of the
plaintiff’s claim.35
26. See Nickels, supra note 12, at 484.
27. See White, supra note 18, at 537; Chari J. Young, Note, Telemedicine: Patient Privacy Rights of
Electronic Medical Records, 66 UMKC L. REV. 921, 930 (1998).
28. See Nickels, supra note 12, at 484–85.
29. Id. at 479.
30. Id. at 486.
31. Roger E. Harris, The Need to Know versus the Right to Know: Privacy of Patient Medical Data
in an Information-Based Society, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1997).
32. See Jennifer L. Klocke, Prescription Records for Sale: Privacy and Free Speech Issues Arising
from the Sale of De-Identified Medical Data, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 511, 519 (2008); Young, supra note 27,
at 928.
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .”) (emphasis added).
34. See White, supra note 18, at 525. A plaintiff acting in a representative capacity for the purpose
of litigation does not waive the physician-patient privilege with respect to his or her own medical histories.
See Nickels, supra note 12, at 485; see, e.g., Murphy v. LoPresti, 648 N.Y.S.2d 169, 169 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (mother who brought birth injury case on behalf of child did not waive her own physician-patient
privilege with respect to records outside of her pregnancy).
35. See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 896.
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Nonparties have not made this implied waiver of their physician-patient
privilege. Therefore, nonparty medical records are not discoverable absent
consent by the nonparty or those entitled to do so in the nonparty’s behalf.36 Even
if nonparty medical records are highly relevant and necessary to a claim,
nonparty waiver of the physician-patient privilege is necessary for discovery. 37
As one court explained:
[I]t is inherent in the very nature of an evidentiary privilege that it
presents an obstacle to discovery and it is precisely in those situations
where confidential information is sought in advancing a legal claim
that such privilege is intended to operate. Were we to carve out an
exception to the privilege whenever it inhibited the fact-finding
process, it would quickly become eviscerated.38
This is true even when the nonparty medical records belong to a close
relative of the plaintiff. The mere fact that a plaintiff has commenced an action
does not subject all the plaintiff’s relatives to the “long arm” reach of the law
authorizing discovery of their medical records.39 For example, in Dierickx v.
Cottage Hospital Corporation,40 the plaintiffs brought an action on behalf of
their daughter who suffered central nervous system damage due to the alleged
negligence of the defendant physician during delivery. The defendant sought to
discover the nonparty medical records of the plaintiffs’ two other children in
order to show that a genetic disorder caused the harm.41 The Michigan Court of
Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that not permitting disclosure was
tantamount to “conceal[ing] evidence likely to establish the truth.”42 Instead, the
court held that “although the requested [nonparty] medical records may be
relevant to defendants’ theory of a genetically transmitted defect, the records are
privileged and not subject to discovery.”43 It reasoned that the health of the two

36. See Wanda Ellen Wakefield, Annotation, Physician-Patient Privilege as Extending to Patient’s
Medical or Hospital Records, 10 A.L.R.4th 552 (2018).
37. See, e.g., Parkson v. Central DuPage Hospital, 435 N.E.2d 140, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(“Although the Illinois statute on the physician-patient privilege exempts civil malpractice actions, we
believe that that exception should be limited to only allow the disclosure of the records of the patient who
is bringing the malpractice action. A broadening of that exception to allow the disclosure of
communications involving patients who are not parties to the litigation would neither serve a public
interest nor the private interests of those nonparty patients.”).
38. Monica W. v. Milevoi, 685 N.Y.S.2d 231, 233 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
39. See, e.g., id. (finding that a lead paint case brought on behalf of child did not constitute waiver of
the parents’ and siblings’ physician-patient privilege); Kunz v. S. Suburban Hosp., 761 N.E.2d 1243,
1247–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that “filing a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of a child, even
when a genetic cause independent of medical malpractice may become an issue, does not thereby waive
the physician-patient privilege in favor of the child’s siblings”).
40. 393 N.W.2d 564 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
41. Id. at 565.
42. Id. at 567.
43. Id.
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younger children had not been placed in controversy and therefore, their personal
physician-patient privilege had not been waived.44
C. Impermissible and Inefficient Expansion of the Scope of Discovery
In general, tort discovery focuses on the plaintiff because the plaintiff’s
condition is at issue.45 Permitting the discovery of nonparty medical records is a
significant departure from this “plaintiff-centered” view. 46 Expanding discovery
to include nonparty medical records has the potential to dramatically broaden the
scope of discovery in some cases.47 For example, in a toxic tort case involving
minor plaintiff, a common question is whether the defendant’s product caused
the plaintiff’s mental and intellectual development.48 What if it is revealed that
the plaintiff’s mother has a low-IQ? Jennifer Wriggens, author of “Genetics, IQ,
Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead Exposure
Litigation,” explained how this scenario creates more questions than answers:
A low-IQ mother might have been deprived of oxygen at birth,
exposed to lead, or a myriad of other factors. Should she be x-rayed
for an early lead exposure? Should her birth records be obtained? Are
the father’s IQ, prenatal, perinatal, head injury, and lead exposure
histories relevant? Should the grandparents histories be examined, as
well? There is no logical end to the litigation inquiry once individual
boundaries are crossed.49
Thus, a clear line that disallows discovery of nonparty medical records
would help prevent arbitrary, inconsistent decisions that improperly broaden the
scope of litigation and disregard nonparty privacy interests. As Supreme Court
Justice Blackman stated, “[l]aw . . . must resolve disputes finally and quickly
. . . . [The] Rules of Evidence [are] designed not for the exhaustive search for
cosmic under-standing but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.”50

44. Id. at 566.
45. See Jennifer Wriggens, Genetics, IQ, Determinism, and Torts: The Example of Discovery in Lead
Exposure Litigation, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1025, 1055 (1997).
46. Id. at 1058.
47. Id. at 1060; White, supra note 18, at 528 (“It has been noted that allowing discovery of the
family’s medical records would raise more questions than it would answers.”).
48. Ronald L. Hack & Jane E. Schilmoeller, Production of Non-Parties’ Medical and Other
Privileged or Private Records, 54 J. MO. B. 123, 126 (1998).
49. Wriggens, supra note 45, at 1060–61.
50. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
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II. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF NONPARTY MEDICAL RECORDS BEING
DISCOVERABLE
Nonparty medical records can be highly relevant sources of information in
litigation. In certain cases, discovery of relevant nonparty medical is necessary
to support a litigant’s theory of liability or defense. Prohibiting the discovery of
relevant nonparty medical records would result in great injustice to the parties
seeking disclosure, infringing on litigants’ due process rights and the judicial
system’s pursuit of the truth. Privacy surrounding medical records is certainly an
important value; however, it must be balanced against these competing interests.
A. Litigants’ Due Process Rights and the Judicial System’s Pursuit of the
Truth
The U.S. Constitution provides that “[no] state shall … deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”51 In the context of civil
litigation, due process requires that all litigants have a meaningful opportunity to
present or defend their case.52 This includes litigants’ ability to investigate and
construct alternative theories of liability and defense.53 This due process right is
complemented by the judicial system’s pursuit of the truth in legal proceedings.54
Broadly speaking, the ultimate objective of every judicial inquiry is to ascertain
the truth.55 Relatedly, the FRCP aim to secure a just determination of every
action.56
Litigants must have full and adequate disclosure of all relevant facts in
order to have a meaningful opportunity to present and defend their cases. The
FRCP establish a broad scope of discovery,57 and discovery requests are liberally

51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite of due process of
law is the opportunity to be heard …. [at] a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (emphasis
added) (internal quotations omitted); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (“Due process requires
that there be an opportunity to present every available defense.”) (internal quotations omitted).
53. See Nickels, supra note 12, at 481.
54. See Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding –
The Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 LAW AND PHIL. J. 497, 497 (1999).
55. See State v. Randall, 431 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (“The ultimate object of every
judicial inquiry is to get at the truth. Therefore no rule of law standing in the way of getting at the truth
should be loosely or mechanically applied.”).
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in
the United States district courts . . . . They should be construed, administered, and employed by the court
and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”)
(emphasis added).
57. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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granted by the courts.58 A party may be permitted to discover relevant evidence
that would be inadmissible at trial, so long as it may lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.59 The Supreme Court discussed the oft-quoted rationale for
the broad discovery standard in an early case:
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the timehonored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential
to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to
disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.60
Complete discovery may require assembling all relevant evidence from
parties and nonparties alike.61 The FRCP specifically contemplate discovery
from nonparties. For example, under FRCP 45 litigants may use subpoenas to
obtain evidence, such as medical records, from nonparty witnesses.62
Although liberal discovery may place burdens on nonparties, it ultimately
increases the likelihood that cases will be decided on the merits.63 Liberal
discovery also furthers just adjudication between the immediate parties to the
litigation.64
B. Exemplifying the Need for Discovery of Relevant Nonparty Medical
Records
In certain cases, nonparty medical records go further in illustrating a theory
of liability or defense than any other piece of evidence.65 The following
subsections describe several categories of cases where litigants often seek access
to nonparty medical records during discovery. The circumstances in these cases
present the strongest need for discovery of relevant nonparty medical records
despite infringing nonparty privacy interests. Courts ultimately make
determinations based on the circumstances of each individual case.66
58. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506–07 (1947).
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
60. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. However, the Court cautioned that discovery has “ultimate and
necessary boundaries” that include inquiries into irrelevant or privileged matters or those conducted in
bad faith. Id. at 507–08.
61. See Nickels, supra note 12, at 483.
62. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(c) (“As provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to produce
documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (allowing discovery from
a nonparty through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum).
63. Charles H. Rabon, Jr., Evening the Odds in Civil Litigation: A Proposed Methodology for Using
Adverse Inferences When Nonparty Witnesses Invoke the Fifth Amendment, 42 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512
(1989).
64. See Rabon, Jr., supra note 63, at 513.
65. See Hack & Schilmoeller, supra note 48, at 126.
66. Id.

198

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 21:189

1. Negligence Claims Involving Children
In cases alleging cognitive, behavioral and/or developmental harm to a
child, defendants may seek to prove that the child’s harm was caused by social,
environmental, or genetic factors rather than any negligence by the defendant.67
These claims typically involve lead paint poisoning, medical malpractice, or
medical products liability.68
The medical histories of the injured child’s parents and siblings can contain
critical information regarding causation. Consider a medical malpractice action
brought by the plaintiffs of behalf of their first-born daughter, alleging that she
failed to develop normally and had suffered central nervous system damage as a
result of the defendants’ negligence.69 During discovery, the child’s mother
testified that her third-born daughter, a nonparty, began exhibiting similar
neurological abnormalities shortly after birth and had been hospitalized multiple
times before she was six months old.70 What if it is revealed that third-born
daughter’s treating physicians suspect a genetic disorder was the cause of her
medical problems?71 Discovery of the third-born daughter’s medical records is
necessary in order to fully explore whether the first-born daughter’s harm was
caused by a genetic disorder rather than the defendants’ alleged negligence.72
Without access to these nonparty medical records, defendants are significantly
disadvantaged and at risk to be held liable for harm they did not cause.
In these types of cases, nonparty medical records are vital sources of
relevant information regarding the true cause of harm. Child psychologists and
pediatric neurologists recognize that to determine whether a causal relationship
exists between a defendant’s alleged negligence and a child’s harm, experts must
account for additional factors, such as social, environmental, and genetic
factors.73 Without such material, defendants cannot present a meaningful defense
and the trier of fact will be left with only a partial answer to the question of
causation.74
For example, Parker v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City,75 involved a
toxic torts action brought against an apartment complex in which it was alleged
that the minor plaintiff suffered brain injuries from exposure to lead-based
67. See Melissa E. Rosenthal, Liberal Discovery of Nonparty Records: In Defense of the Defense, 7
CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 59, 68 (2000).
68. See Hope Viner Samborn, Blame It on the Bloodline: Discovery of Nonparties’ Medical and
Psychiatric Records Is Latest Defense Tactic in Disputing Causation, 85 A.B.A. J. 28, 28 (1999).
69. See Dierickx, 393 N.W.2d at 565.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. Ultimately, the Dierickx court refused to allow production of the sister’s medical records. See,
supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
73. See Hack & Schilmoeller, supra note 48, at 126; See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 68.
74. See Hack & Schilmoeller, supra note 48, at 126.
75. 742 A.2d 522 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
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paint.76 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals recognized that discovery of a
neuropsychologist’s report regarding the minor plaintiff’s mother, a nonparty,
was of “fundamental importance” to properly determine the cause of the minor
plaintiff’s cognitive injuries.77 In doing so, the Court highlighted a portion of the
neuropsychologist’s affidavit, which stated:
The need for an evaluation of [the plaintiff’s mother] is based upon the body
of scientific evidence which establishes a genetic relationship between parental
and child IQs in the area of intellectual development . . . [A] significant
component of intellectual development is determined by hereditary rather than
environmental factors.78
Thus, because genetic factors likely impacted the plaintiff’s cognitive
abilities, the nonparty mother’s neuropsychology report was discoverable in
order to determine the true cause of the plaintiff’s harm.
2. Birth Injury Claims
Birth injury claims are a specific type of medical malpractice claim in
which harm to a minor child is alleged to have resulted from a healthcare
provider’s negligent prenatal care and/or delivery. In birth injury cases, most
courts hold that a nonparty mother’s medical records for the time period when
the child was in utero because there can be no severance of the infant’s prenatal
history from the nonparty mother’s medical history.79 Courts recognize that the
prenatal period, an important time in the development of an unborn child, is
highly relevant in determining the true cause of a child’s harm and the only
source of such information is the mother’s medical records.80
The “impossibility of severance” theory limits discovery to the mother’s
prenatal medical records.81 However, nonparty medical records can also be
highly relevant to causation in birth injury claims for the same reasons set forth
in the previous section.82
76. See id. at 523.
77. See id. at 524. In Parker, the Housing Authority sought to compel the plaintiff’s mother, a
nonparty, to submit to a mental examination. Id. at 523. The compulsory medical examination of a
nonparty is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the court’s opinion about the “fundamental
importance” of such an examination to the true cause of the plaintiff’s harm is relevant to this paper.
78. Id. at 524.
79. See Nickels, supra note 12, at 485; see, e.g., Payal v. Super. Ct. of L.A., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839,
840 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the mother’s prenatal records relating to the child were discoverable
because the child’s medical records were inseparable from those of mother during the time the child was in
utero). The mother is a nonparty even when acting as a plaintiff in a representative capacity for the injured
child. See, supra note 34.
80. See White, supra note 18, at 530.
81. Id. at 530.
82. See, e.g., Vincent v. Connaught Lab., Inc., 131 F.R.D. 156, 158–59 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (permitting
discovery of the pregnancy and birth records of the plaintiff’s mother concerning her five children who
were born before the brain damaged infant-plaintiff).
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3. Medical Malpractice Claims and Nonparty Patients
Plaintiffs also seek discovery of relevant nonparty medical records to
investigate and support their negligence claims.83 In certain situations, medical
records of a healthcare provider’s nonparty patients are highly relevant regarding
breach in the standard of care and causation.84 For example, consider a medical
malpractice action against a physician for negligently abandoning the plaintiff
while she was in labor, causing harm to her minor child.85 During the defendant’s
deposition, she testified that the plaintiff was left for only a short period of time
to attend to a burn patient in the emergency room.86 The emergency room
medical records of the nonparty burn patient are necessary to determine the
condition of the burn patient and whether the defendant’s absence during the
plaintiff’s labor was justified.87
In Amente v. Newman,88 the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action
alleging that her physician’s failure to use the proper type of delivery bed during
plaintiff’s high-risk pregnancy resulted in injury to her newborn child.89 The
plaintiff, who weighed over 300 pounds, alleged that the defendant negligently
opted to use a regular delivery bed rather than a drop-down delivery bed.90
Therefore, the plaintiff sound discovery of the medical records for all the
defendant’s “markedly obese” patients that gave birth over a specific two year
time period.91 The Amente court ordered disclosure,92 finding that the nonparty
medical records were relevant to show that the defendant had notice that failure
to use the drop-down delivery bed was a deficient method for “markedly obese”
patients.93 Further, if the nonparty medical records revealed that the defendant
used drop-down delivery beds with his other “markedly obese” patients and that
no injuries occurred to their infants, such evidence might be relevant to
causation.94
Nonparty medical records are also highly relevant to a plaintiff’s claim
against a hospital for its negligent supervision or retention of a medical staff
member whose negligence caused harm to the plaintiff. Medicals records of the

83. See White, supra note 18, at 527.
84. See Hack & Schilmoeller, supra note 48, at 126.
85. See Bennett v. Fieser, 152 F.R.D. 641, 642 (D. Kan. 1994).
86. Id.
87. See id. The Bennett court ordered disclosure on the condition that: (1) identifying information be
removed and (2) no attempt be made to contact or learn the identities of the nonparties. Id. at 644.
88. 653 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 1995).
89. Id. at 1031.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the trial court’s order that the redacted records
be produced. Id. at 1031, 1033.
93. Id. at 1032–33.
94. Id.
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staff member’s nonparty patients are peculiarly appropriate tools for determining
whether the hospital had sufficient prior information to be put on notice
regarding a staff member’s negligence. For example, in Ziegler v. Superior
Court,95 the plaintiff brought a negligent supervision action against a hospital
whose physician performed unnecessarily pacemaker implantation surgery on
the plaintiff.96 To show that the hospital had notice of the physician’s
incompetence, the plaintiff sought to discover the medical records of nonparty
patients who undergone pacemaker implantations by the allegedly negligent
physician.97 The Ziegler court ordered disclosure, reasoning that the nonparty
medical records were relevant and that refusing disclosure would result in an
injustice to the plaintiff.98
III. THE MINIMAL IMPACT OF HIPAA
Privacy rights with respect to medical information, particularly medical
records, are protected by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, commonly referred to as “HIPAA.”99 Congress authorized the United
States Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations,
collectively known as the HIPAA Privacy Rule, establishing strict privacy
protections for healthcare information.100 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule governs
“protected health information” (PHI),101 which is broadly defined and includes
many different types of information, including medical and hospital records.102
The Privacy Rule sets national standards that place limits and conditions on the
use and disclosure of medical records. In general, compliance with HIPAA

95. 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
96. Id. at 1252.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1255. Id. at 394. Specifically, the court ordered disclosure of the nonparty medical records
on the condition that: (1) identifying information be removed; (2) the records be sealed by the court after
review by the parties; (3) no attempt be made to contact or learn the identities of the nonparties; and (4)
information may only be communicated to the parties, except as may occur at trial. Id. at 1254.
99. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1938 (1996).
100. See Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 924 (7th Cir. 2004). The Privacy Rule is located
at 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and Subparts A and E of 164. The HIPAA Privacy Rule, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html (last
updated April 16, 2015).
101. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (2017).
102. Id. § 160.103 (defining PHI as individually identifiable health information maintained in or
transmitted in any form or media except as otherwise provided by the rule); id. (defining individually
identifiable health information as information, including demographic data, that relates to
the individual’s past, present or future physical or mental health or condition, the provision of health care
to the individual, or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care to the individual,
and that identifies the individual or for which there is a reasonable basis to believe can be used
to identify the individual).
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requires parties seeking discovery of nonparty medical records to obtain the
nonparty’s written consent.103
This protection from disclosure is thwarted, however, by an exception that
allows for the proper disclosure of medical records in civil litigation without the
patient’s prior written authorization. This occurs either by court order, or through
a formal discovery request, such as a subpoena.104 Where a court order is used,
only the information “expressly authorized” by the order can be disclosed.105
Where a discovery request is used, the party seeking the information must give
the nonparty notice of the request, and the court time to resolve any objections
and issue an order memorializing its decision in a protective order.106 Therefore,
HIPAA ultimately puts the decision of whether discovery of nonparty medical
records is permissible back in the hands of the courts.
Additionally, the Privacy Rule sets no restrictions on the disclosure of deidentified health information because it is no longer considered protected health
information.107 De-identified health information is defined as information that
neither identifies nor provides a reasonable basis to identify an individual.108 The
Privacy Rule provides de-identification standards and implementation
specifications.109 However, as further explained in Part IV, infra, redacting
identifying information is often an ineffective means of maintaining nonparty
privacy rights.
Nevertheless, while HIPAA places few barriers to discovery of nonparty
medical records, it still gives effect to state law that offers greater privacy
protections for medical records. The Privacy Rule does not preempt state privacy
law that is “more stringent” than HIPAA.110 A state privacy law is “more
stringent” when the state law “prohibits or restricts a use or disclosure in
circumstances under which such use or disclosure otherwise would be permitted”
under HIPAA.111 For example, some courts have found the physician-patient
privilege more stringent than HIPAA because the privilege prohibits use or
disclosure of health information when such use or disclosure would be allowed
under HIPAA.112 Similarly, where state law contained no exception for the

103. See id. § 164.502(a) (prohibiting the use or disclosure of patient health information without the
patient’s written consent except as specifically authorized by the rules).
104. See id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i)–(ii).
105. See id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i).
106. See id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(A)–(B) (setting forth requirement of notice or protective order).
107. See id. § 164.502(d)(2).
108. See id. §164.514(a).
109. See id. §164.514(b).
110. See id. § 160.203(b).
111. Id. § 160.202(1).
112. See, e.g., Grove v. Ne. Ohio Nephrology Assocs., 844 N.E.2d 400, 407 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005)
(finding privacy protections provided by the Ohio physician-patient privilege statute more stringent than
HIPAA).
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disclosure of an individual’s private health information without a written
authorization, state law was deemed to provide more privacy protection for
medical information than HIPAA.113
IV. TRADITIONAL SAFEGUARDS
Courts have traditionally employ procedural safeguards, such as redaction
and protective orders, to maintain nonparty privacy rights without denying
discovery of relevant nonparty medical records altogether, which can
compromise litigants’ due process rights and the judicial system’s search for the
truth. Many courts have allowed discovery of relevant nonparty medical records
over privacy objections when safeguards, such as redaction, were in place to
protect nonparty identities.114 However, safeguards do not always adequately
protect nonparty privacy rights. Even with the utilization of safeguards, nonparty
privacy rights are still invaded. Such personal facts, once disclosed, can never be
rendered completely private again.
This section addresses common procedural safeguards courts use and
briefly explains the inadequacies of each. As further explained in Part V, infra,
these safeguards are best utilized as an added layer of protection for nonparty
privacy rights once the “good cause” need for discovery is sufficiently
established.
A. Redaction
Redaction is not always an adequate solution because it only protects
nonparty identities in limited circumstances, without any guarantee of nonparty
anonymity.115 Redaction is ineffective when the identity of the nonparty is
known to the litigants. As previously explained, discovery of nonparty medical
records is often sought when litigants know the identity of the nonparty, such as
siblings or parents of the plaintiff. In these cases, redaction provides no privacy
protection.
Additionally, redaction is ineffective when there is a distinct possibility that
nonparty identification can be made despite the deletion of identifying
information from the nonparty’s medical records.116 For example, redaction was
113. See, e.g., Isidore Steiner, D.P.M., P.C. v. Bonanni, 807 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011)
(finding that state law was more stringent because “the language of HIPAA allows for permissive
disclosure, whereas Michigan law generally prohibits disclosure.”)
114. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Other courts have gone farther, expressly stating that
redaction of identifying information removes the privileged status of confidential communications in
medical records. See, e.g., Wipf v. Altstiel, 888 N.W.2d 790, 794 (S.D. 2016) (reasoning that “anonymous,
non-identifying information is not protected by the physician-patient privilege because there is no
patient once the information is redacted.”).
115. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (providing the standards for de-dentification of protected
health information under the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
116. See White, supra note 18, at 534.
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deemed ineffective in a medical malpractice case where the plaintiff sought
discovery of redacted patient triage records because comparison of the redacted
triage records with the patient entries on the sign-in logs, previously disclosed to
the plaintiff during discovery, would indicate to whom the triage records
pertain.117
Redaction is only practical for protecting nonparty privacy when litigants
seek the medical records of numerous unknown nonparties. Even then, redaction
is still not a reliable means of privacy protection because it does not guarantee
anonymity.118 Modern advancements in technology allow for the subsequent “reidentification” of a large volume of de-identified aggregate patient information
at an ever-increasing rate.119 Moreover, little room exists for error. To the extent
redaction fails, the nonparty’s privacy will become permanently compromised.
Finally, nonparties reasonably expect that the medical information they
share with their physicians will remain private. Simply redacting identifying
information from nonparty medical records does not alleviate this expectation.120
The case of Binder v. Superior Court121 illustrates this concern. In Binder, the
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the defendant physician for his
negligent failure to diagnose the decedent’s lesion as cancerous.122 Plaintiff
sought production of any photographs in defendant’s possession showing a
lesion suspected or diagnosed as melanoma.123 The defendant argued disclosure
was improper based on the physician-patient privilege.124 The plaintiff argued
that disclosing the photographs alone, without any identifying information, did
not violate the physician-patient privilege.125 The Binder court rejected this
argument, explaining:

117. Big Sun Healthcare Sys. v. Prescott, 582 So.2d 756, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Triage records
are considered part of a patient’s medical records because they contain information such as symptoms and
past medical history. Id.
118. See Klocke, supra note 32 at 518–21 (discussing the privacy concerns surrounding the use of
patient de-identified prescription data); see, e.g., Parkson, 435 N.E.2d at 144 (“Whether the patients’
identities would remain confidential by the exclusion of their names and identifying numbers is
questionable at best. . . . The patients’ admit and discharge summaries arguably contain histories of the
patients’ prior and present medical conditions, information that in the cumulative can make the possibility
of recognition very high.”).
119. Klocke, supra note 32, at 520; see id. at 521 (“The rise of patient-level data aggregation combined
with the increased sophistication of re identification techniques has left patients more exposed to privacy
threats than ever before.”).
120. See, e.g., Roe v. Planned Parenthood, 219 N.E.2d 61, 79 (Ohio 2009) (stating that “[r]edaction is
merely a tool that a court may use to safeguard the personal, identifying information within confidential
records that have become subject to disclosure either by waiver or by an exception.”).
121. 242 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
122. Id. at 232.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 233.
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[D]isclosure of the subject photographs would subvert both objectives
of the physician-patient privilege. First, it would undoubtedly shock
and humiliate present and former patients of defendant to learn that
pictures of their bodies and ailments would be turned over to
strangers. Furthermore, it is probable the patients’ sensibilities would
be offended whether or not their identities are disclosed together with
the photographs.126
B. Protective Orders
The protection of privacy is implicit in the language of FRCP 26(c), which
governs protective orders.127 Rule 26(c) provides that upon motion by “[a] party
or any person from whom discovery is sought . . . [t]he court may, for good
cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .”128 Courts use
protective orders to define precise limits on the use of discoverable nonparty
medical records, such as who should have access to the records and for what
purpose(s) they may be used.129
Despite these benefits, protective orders are not sufficient to protect
nonparty privacy interests because the party seeking a protective order bears the
burden of proving the necessity of the order.130 Nonparties have the greatest
interest in seeking a protective order to prevent or limit discovery of their medical
records. However, nonparties are at a disadvantage because they are unlikely to
be represented by counsel. This leaves “unsuspecting third parties [forced] to
retain counsel to fend off demands for private medical documents.”131
Alternatively, the litigant opposing discovery or the healthcare provider in
possession of the nonparty medical records may seek a protective order. In that
case, the nonparty must trust that the moving litigant or healthcare provider, each
with self-serving, independent goals for litigation, will adequately protect the
nonparty’s privacy interests. Placing nonparties in this position is patently unfair.

126. Id.; see, e.g., Ashcroft, 362 F.3d at 929 (“Even if there were no possibility that a patient’s identity
might be learned from a redacted medical record, there would be an invasion of privacy. Imagine if nude
pictures of a woman, uploaded to the Internet without her consent though without identifying her by name,
were downloaded in a foreign country by people who will never meet her. She would still feel that her
privacy had been invaded. The revelation of the intimate details contained in the record of a late-term
abortion may inflict a similar wound.”).
127. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 35 n.21 (1984) (“Although the Rule contains
no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests that may be implicated, such matters are
implicit in the broad purpose and language of the Rule.”) (internal quotations omitted).
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
129. See Miller, supra note 6, at 495.
130. See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 902.
131. In re N.Y. Cty. DES Litig., 570 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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V. THE “GOOD CAUSE” STANDARD
Discovery of nonparty medical records should be permitted, but only upon
a heightened showing of “good cause” similar to the requirement imposed by
FRCP 35 for compelled physical and mental examinations of parties.132 Once the
“good cause” burden is met by the party seeking discovery, courts should utilize
safeguards, such as redaction, to further protect nonparty privacy interests as
much as possible.
Because a compelled medical examination is the most intrusive form of
medical discovery,133 Rule 35 utilizes a “good cause” standard to provide
additional protection for litigants.134 This “good cause” requirement is a stricter
burden than the standard relevance showing required under the general scope of
discovery.135 In Schlagenhauf v. Holder,136 the Supreme Court considered the
meaning of “good cause”:
The specific requirement of good cause would be meaningless if good
cause could be sufficiently established by merely showing that the
desired materials are relevant, for the relevancy standard has already
been imposed by Rule 26 (b). Thus, by adding the words ‘. . . good
cause . . . ,’ the Rules indicate that there must be greater showing of
need under [Rules 35] than under the other discovery rules.137
The Supreme Court further explained that the “good cause” requirement is
“not met by mere conclusory allegations of the pleadings – nor by mere relevance
to the case….”138
Borrowing this “good cause” standard and applying it in the context of
discovery of nonparty medical records strikes the necessary balance between the
competing interests discussed, supra, in Part I and Part II. The added “good
cause” sets a high bar for discovery of nonparty medical records, recognizing
that nonparties have a strong interest in maintaining the confidentiality of their
medical records. This interest cannot be outweighed unless discovery of
nonparty medical records is necessary to allow litigants a meaningful opportunity
to present or defend their case. This need is satisfied by a “good cause” showing.
Therefore, where “good cause” is shown, litigants’ due process and the judicial
system’s pursuit of the truth must be recognized.

132. FRCP 35 provides that a court may order a mental or physical examination of a party whose
mental or physical condition is “in controversy,” upon a showing of “good cause.” See FED. R. CIV. P.
35(a).
133. See Rothstein, supra note 1, at 889.
134. See FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a).
135. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 35(a)(1) (rule for compelled physical and mental examinations),
with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (rule for general scope of discovery).
136. 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
137. Id. at 118 (internal quotations omitted).
138. Id.
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Litigants seeking discovery of nonparty medical records must produce
sufficient information to adequately demonstrate “good cause” for the records to
be disclosed, even where nonparty identifying information is redacted. Mere
fishing expeditions based on general assertions of relevance cannot meet the
“good cause” burden. The movant must show that discovery of the nonparty
medical records will adduce specific facts relevant to the cause of action and
necessary to the case.139 The “good cause” showing may be made by affidavits
or other evidentiary support.140 In some cases, an evidentiary hearing may be
necessary.141 Additionally, courts should examine the “ability of the movant to
obtain the desired information by other means….”142 Movants must show that
there is no other method to acquire the information sought to be gained by
discovering nonparty medical records.143
In conjunction with the “good cause” requirement, courts should utilize
traditional safeguards, such as redaction and protective orders, to further
safeguard nonparty privacy interests. As explained in Part IV, supra, safeguards
alone are often ineffective. However, once “good cause” for discovery is
established, traditional safeguards provide further assurance that nonparty
privacy interests are being given the utmost consideration and protection despite
the compelling need for disclosure.
CONCLUSION
Courts faced with the dilemma of whether nonparty medical records should
be discoverable in civil litigation have reached differing conclusions. Intrusions
into the privacy of nonparty medical records are objectionable. Moving forward,
courts should utilize the “good cause” standard, coupled with procedural
safeguards, to determine on a case-by-case basis whether nonparty medical
records should be discoverable. This heightened standard better serves the
privacy interests of nonparties while facilitating litigants’ due process rights and
the truth-finding process.

139. See Womack v. Stevens Transp., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 445, 447 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (describing Rule 35’s
good cause requirement).
140. Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 119.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 118.
143. See, e.g., Womack, 205 F.R.D. at 447.

